▲ Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush signed the Rome Declaration, which established Russia’s new relations with NATO.Photo taken from the Internet
Juan Pablo Duch
Correspondent
The newspaper La Jornada
Monday, July 22, 2024, p. 27
Second and last part
Moscow. Among the documents declassified by the National Security Archive (NSA) is the draft letter prepared by Under Secretary Strobe Talbott in response to George F. Kennan, considered the author of the theory of nuclear deterrence, who shared with the State Department on January 31, 1997, his concern about NATO enlargement, calling it “the greatest mistake of Western policy in the entire post-NATO era.” cold War”, which, in his opinion, could undermine the construction of democracy in Russia and lead to the rise of nationalist forces. Kennan published the text of his letter as an article in the newspaper The New York Times on February 5 of that year.
Talbott disagreed and argues in his response that a reformed NATO would not be a threat to Russian interests and states that The essence of strategy, as I see it, is to prepare for the worst while trying to achieve the best..
He concludes that he continues to believe that the arguments for NATO expansion were compelling enough to offset negative opposition in Russia (draft letter from Strobe Talbott to George F. Kennan, February 9, 1997).
With Yeltsin elected, the Clinton administration began preparations for NATO enlargement, while trying to prevent relations with Russia from falling into a serious decline. During this time, there were constant consultations with Russia: the White House wanted new members, the Kremlin did not.
Russia insisted on at least three conditions to counter the seemingly inevitable expansion: no military infrastructure, especially nuclear weapons, would be installed in the territories of the new members, a binding mechanism would be established to influence the alliance’s decision-making, and the entry of the Baltic countries and Ukraine would be rejected.
Undersecretary of State John Kornblum said he did not view these demands as Russia’s price for agreeing to NATO expansion and suggested focusing on offering Moscow achieving the most cooperative security relationship possible, in which Russia would be integrated into a new security community in Europe. (NATO-Russia: A framework for the new phase. Memorandum from John Kornblum, July 29, 1996).
Obligatory step
Among the papers brought to light, a record of conversation between then-presidents Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton in Helsinki is particularly relevant, two months before signing the Russia-NATO Founding Act in 1997, which was presented to the world as a historic document that put an end to the cold War and which the Russian leader privately described as an obligatory step (Minutes of conversation. Clinton-Yeltsin Summit, Helsinki, Finland, March 21, 1997).
In that key conversation in March 1997, the Russian president told his American counterpart: Our position has not changed. NATO’s expansion to the East is a mistake. I have to take steps to mitigate the negative effects of this for Russia. I am ready to sign the Founding Act not because I want to, but because it is a necessary step. As of today, there is no alternative. (Ibid).
Yeltsin still insisted on Russia’s three conditions. He even proposed a gentlemen’s agreement secret agreement in which he suggested putting in the Founding Act that Russia was not opposed to anyone joining NATO, but wanted the United States to secretly commit to not allowing the accession of any former Soviet republic, especially Ukraine.
I propose to write in the text (of the minutes) that Russia has no objections to anyone. Regarding the countries of the former Soviet Union, let us conclude a verbal gentlemen’s agreement. We will not include in the official document that no former Soviet republic will join NATO. We will not make this gentlemen’s agreement public.Yeltsin suggested (Ibidem).
Clinton convinced Yeltsin that such a secret pact was not possible because in today’s world There can be no secrets Such a pact could be misinterpreted and negatively affect Russia’s image, revealing its imperial ambitions and causing concern in the Baltic countries. Nobody is talking about a comprehensive, total and accelerated expansion.Clinton concluded (Ibid).
Just two years later, in 1999, after the enlargement promoted by Clinton with the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was completed, the Kremlin bet everything on strengthening the relationship, which – five years later – took shape in the so-called Rome Declaration, signed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2002, among other heads of state.
Russia and NATO agreed to cooperate in areas such as counter-terrorism, political settlement of crises, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms control and confidence-building measures, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and reform of the armed forces, and new threats and challenges.
But a couple of years later – and just two weeks after Putin’s first re-election – in 2004, six more countries suddenly joined NATO, including the three Baltic republics. But that was already in the first decade of the 2000s and how Russia and the United States negotiated it is still a secret.
